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Abstract
Most analyses of the African Union (AU) focus on the politics of the state and presidents.
There are very few analyses that focus on aspects such as youth development. This article
departs from that tradition. It argues that although the youth were always part of important
historical developments in Africa, they have remained on the periphery. In recent times,
particularly since the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the AU in
the 2000s, the youth development agenda has begun to receive attention at the policy level.
In 2015, the AU through Agenda 2063 went a step further by elevating youth matters to
the mainstream continental policy framework. While these developments are all welcome,
it emerges clear that in the arena of youth political participation, the continent remains
hesitant. Where the AU and its member states adopt the language and grammar of youth
inclusion, of which youth political participation is often limited, such is not met with fitting
institutional and practical policy arrangements. This article finds that the African elite is in
for a rude awakening, as we have witnessed since 2011, given the discovery by the African
youth of new methods of political participation in post-colonial Africa. It advocates for the
adoption of the African community outlook to a youth state policy, argues for linking youth
to the project of economic freedom, and implores the African elite to embark upon the
decolonial project to resolve the bearings of coloniality of being, power and knowledge.
Introduction
Although the youth played an important role in the fight against colonialism in Africa, the
liberating generation upon taking office did not see the need of placing youth development at the
center of state policy in the liberated zones. The youth were to regard themselves as beneficiaries
of an independent Africa which must be grateful to the fearless freedom fighters who freed the
continent from colonial rule. 24 years after Namibia attained independence, former President of
Namibia Hifikepunye Pohamba gave this warning to the youth of Namibia on 26 August 2014:
“this [liberation struggle] was not easy as some of you want to believe. It was hard, long and bitter
and we, the old freedom fighters, fought to the end and liberated the country and the people. Some
of us lost our lives because of this right cause (Shivute, 2014).
In some extreme cases, the expectations of the youth to sing praises to liberating heroes led
to dictatorships. In Malawi, President Kamuzu Banda ensured that everything in Malawi had been
revolved around him. As Malawian academic Professor Wiseman Chijere Chirwa explains
“throughout the 1960s, political songs reflected Banda's consolidation of power and his emerging
dictatorship. Because of his heroic triumph, everything in the country belonged to him” (Chirwa
2001, p. 8). African liberation leaders even created concepts and philosophies that were forced
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down the throats of the citizens as national philosophies and concepts. South African political
scientist Prince Mashele explains such an occurrence in Kenya:
In Kenya, during the reign of Daniel Arap Moi… citizens were obliged to follow in the
footsteps of Moi. To entrench his despotism, Moi introduced a philosophy called Nyayo
(footstep) projecting himself as a pathfinder and the rest of society as followers. Political
commentators who dared not to follow in Moi’s footsteps faced one of two hard realities:
you disappear or flee to exile. So serious was Moi about his Nyayo philosophy that he
could replace a vice-chancellor of any university with someone prepared to follow in the
correct political footsteps. (Mashele, 2011)
The continent is, therefore, nourished with many examples illustrating how African
liberation leaders perceived post-independent Africa as a personal trophy they obtained for
liberating the continent through their heroic deeds. The citizens, particularly the youth, must at all
time - it was made clear - be grateful and celebrate the freedom fighters and allow them to rule
undisturbed. Fast forward to 2017, Africa still has the world’s oldest leaders. Below is an
illustration of Africa’s top 20 oldest presidents for illustrative purposes;
Table 1
Rulers by country and age
Name
1. Robert Mugabe
2. Beji Caid Essebsi
3. Paul Biya
4. Abselaziz Bouteflika
5. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
6. Alpha Conde
7. Peter Mutharika
8. Hage Geingob
9. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo
10. Jose Eduardo dos Santos
11. Alassane Ouattara
12. Jacob Zuma
13. Mohammadu Buhari
14. Denis Ngueso
15. Akufo Addo
16. Yoweri Museveni
17. Pakalitha Mosilili
18. Omar al-Bashir
19. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita
20. Ismail Omar Guelleh
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Country
Zimbabwe
Tunisia
Cameroon
Algeria
Liberia
Guinea
Malawi
Namibia
Equatorial Guinea
Angola
Cote d’ivore
South Africa
Nigeria
Congo
Ghana
Uganda
Lesotho
Sudan
Mali
Djibouti

Age
93
91
84
80
79
79
77
76
75
75
75
75
74
74
73
73
73
73
72
71
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To put Table 1 in fitting context and to understand how liberating leaders in Africa saw
themselves as the only ones to govern Africa, it is necessary to juxtapose the above table to Table
2 of Africa’s longest serving leaders. The table below shows that most of Africa’s oldest leaders
are also the longest serving leaders. Although it may appear obvious that the oldest would be
longest serving, it must be clarified, for example, that while Ghana’s Akufo Addo may be Africa’s
15th oldest leader, he only has been in office a few months, having assumed office only in January
2017. Namibia’s Hage Geingob is Africa’s 8th oldest leader but has only spent two years in office
since his inauguration in March 2015.
Table 2
Leaders by country and years in office
Name
1. Paul Biya
2. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo
3. Jose Eduardo dos Santos
4. Robert Mugabe
5. Yoweri Museveni
6. Omar al-Bashir
7. Idris Deby
8. Isaias Afwerki
9. Paul Kagame
10. Denis Sassou Nguesso

Country
Cameroon
Equatoria Guinea
Angola
Zimbabwe
Uganda
Sudan
Chad
Eritrea
Rwanda
Congo

Years in office
42 years
38 years
38 years
37 years
31 years
28 years
27 years
26 years
23 years
20 years

This state of African leadership has not only generated an interest by foreign scholars, such
as Aguilar (1998), but from countries led by relatively younger leaders. African scholars and
researchers have also taken keen interest in this debate. This debate is captured around the concept
of gerontocracy. Nigerian academic, Omotade Adegbindin, explains that a gerontocracy “is a
political system, a form of oligarchical rule, whereby a small group of elderly individuals are in
control of power. Unpopular due to its peculiar nature, it is in short, a rule by old men”
(Adegbindin, 2011, p. 454). Drawing from other scholars to locate this concept in Africa,
Adegbindin (2011) captures Dei (1994) explaining that in African tradition a gerontocracy is seen
as occurring where “respect for the authority of elderly persons for their wisdom, knowledge of
community affairs, and ‘closeness’ to the ancestors… there is in Africa a general belief that ‘old
age comes with wisdom and an understanding of the world’” (Adegbindin, 2011, p. 13). Kenyan
academic Peter Onyango Onyoyo provides clarity in detail:
Gerontocracy is the rule by elders or a type of government that associates leadership with
elders. … Ipso facto in several African traditional societies in which customary law ruled
the lives of people, the role of elders was substantial and critical for order and harmony.
The elders are construed to be the custodians of customary law, its promulgators and
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enforcers… In the post-independent Africa, gerontocracy in the political sense has become
notorious as some elders cling on power to dominate and favour their next of kin.
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is an example in which the leader sees his status as
elder to be the reason to cling on power. The late Muammar Ghedafi did the same in Libya,
President Paul Biye of Cameroon, and the late President Eyadema of Togo did the same.
Elders in political leadership in Africa have been associated with hunger for power other
than wisdom. (Onyoyo 2017, pp. 2-3)
It should, therefore, be no surprise that the entire structure of the OAU did not have a clear
and specialized function dedicated to a continental youth development agenda. The Pan African
Youth Movement (PYM) which later became the Pan African Youth Union (PYU) established in
1962 (a year before the founding of the OAU in 1963) was recognized by the OUA but never
integrated into its activities. Historically, the PYM consisted of the youth of African ruling political
parties in general and youth of former liberation movements in particular. After achieving
independence, the PYM lost currency in the eyes of the liberating leaders subsequently losing
momentum (Nueys, 2012). The African Union (AU), the successor of the OAU, established in
1999, only became concerned with youth development seven years after its formation. This is
confirmed by the AU 2011 State of the African Youth Report 2011 in no uncertain terms.
Africa’s commitment to youth development and welfare was amply manifested in 2006
with the adoption by African Heads of State and Government of the African Youth Charter.
The charter provides a framework for developing and implementing more tangible youth
policies and programmes. (AUC, 2012, p. VII)
In a foreword to the same report, Professor Jean-Pierre Ezin, the then Commissioner for
Human Resources, Science and Technology of the African Union Commission (AUC),
summarized what to him was continental commitment to the continental youth development
agenda.
The African Union Commission has come a long way in its efforts to promote youth
development and empowerment in Africa. It developed the African Youth Charter, which
was approved by African Heads of State and Government in 2006 and which entered into
force in a relatively short time. The Charter constitutes a continental legal framework that
seeks to re-position the challenges, potential, contributions and rights of young people in
the mainstream of Africa’s socio-economic growth and development. In 2009, the AU
Executive Council declared the years 2009-2018 as the Decade for Youth Development
and Empowerment in Africa. Subsequently, the AU Ministers in Charge of Youth Affairs
approved the Decade Plan of Action (DPoA) – a roadmap for accelerating the
implementation of the charter. By deciding to focus on the theme Accelerating Youth
Empowerment for Sustainable Development for the 2011 Summit of African Union Heads
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of State and Government, the AU demonstrates the importance it attaches to the role and
contribution of the youth in the development process. (AU 2012, p. VI)
The mindset of the liberation leaders – of youth to be grateful to political freedom fighters
– has extended to the technical staff of the AUC. How else does one explain AUC commissioner
Ezin’s conclusion that something as flimsy as a theme can be regarded as demonstrating the
importance that the AU attaches to the role and contribution of the youth in the development
process? In 2011, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) released its 2011
African Youth Report. Abdoulie Janneh, the then United Nations Under-Secretary-General and
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, did not conceal the reality of the
exclusion and nonparticipation of African youth in decision making.
As argued in this report, young people need an enabling environment politically,
economically and socially to thrive in our countries. They need to be empowered so that
they can be represented and participate in decision-making processes that affect their lives.
Though Africa has made progress in providing education and skills for more young people
than ever before, youth unemployment and underemployment remain a major challenge.
Innovative approaches and in-depth analysis of youth issues at both the design and
implementation phases of policies and programmes are needed to ensure effective delivery
and better outcomes towards a great future for the young women and men of Africa.
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2011, p. VIII)
To its credit, the AU distinguished itself from the OAU by creating a youth division within
the structures of the AUC. According to the AU, the “youth division under the Department of
Human Resources, Science & Technology (HRST) is the division responsible for Africa’s Youth
Agenda in the African Union Commission (AUC)” (African Union Commission, 2017). Most
importantly, the AU’s language and articulation of the importance of the youth division is the most
telling in the subsequent sentences, “It [Youth Division] promotes youth participation such as
organizing youth forums and celebrating Africa Youth Day. By harmonizing and coordinating
member states as well as bringing together all relevant stakeholders, the youth division is mandated
to, among other functions, use the outcomes and recommendations from all sectors through
appropriate training frameworks to strengthen the African Youth” (African Union Commission,
2017).
What the above states is simply that the AU sees youth participation as represented by
flimsy things such as celebrating Youth Day. This mindset is similar to that of Kamuzu Banda of
Malawi, as discussed earlier, who saw the role of the youth and women as that of singing, clapping
hands and celebrating him. The AU makes it clear that the mandate of the division is not to ensure
that youth have input into decisions but merely to receive and accept outcomes and
recommendations. From the 21st-25th of May 2016, the AU held what was called the Banjul+10
Summit on the 10-year implementation of the African Youth Charter in The Gambia to review the
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progress made in regard to the African Youth Charter since its adoption in 2006. It was found that
most African states still did not ratify the Charter. In the outcome document, the AU set a target
of ensuring that there would be a “hundred percent ratification by the end of 2016” (African Union,
2016). Speaking on the future prospects for African youth, in Germany on 6 April 2017 at the
Potsdam Dialogues, the AUC Commissioner for Human Resources, Science and Technology,
Martial De-Paul Ikounga, disclosed that the wishful target of 100 percent ratification of the charter
that was previously set in Banjul was not achieved (Ikounga, 2017).
What emerges clearly from the above is that to both the OAU and its successor the AU, the
youth and the youth agenda are either a non-issue or peripheral issue. In response, the youth did
not sit idle. There have been a number of responses from the African youth. Although the PYU
enjoyed cordial relations with both the OUA and AU, it faced several challenges, particularly
financial challenges, given the somewhat ‘arm-chair’ approach of leadership of the continental
body. The continental youth body was forced to change its headquarters three times: from
Conakry, Guinea, to Algiers, Algeria in 1967; then from Algiers to Khartoum, Sudan, in 2008
(NUEYS, 2012). Speaking at the African Youth Day on 1 November 2012, the former chairperson
of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma admitted the serious challenges faced
by the PYU thus promising the AUC’s commitment to embark upon the revitalization of the Pan
African Youth Union (The Point, 2012). It does not require sophistication to note that revitalization
can only take place when faced with decline and weakening.
From the 1st to 4th of November 2013 in Tunisia, the AUC in collaboration with the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) coordinating Agency, the African Development
Bank and the ECA organized a youth consultative meeting on the envisaged Agenda 2063. This
meeting culminated in the establishment of the AU Youth Working Group (AUYWG). The
AUYWG later transformed itself into the African Youth Commission (AYC) that held its first
General Assembly and elected the founding leadership in January 2017 on the sidelines of the AU
Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The AYC, seeing itself as the youth version of the AUC, set its
objective as an organization where “all inspiring and capable young African leaders and African
Diaspora can organize themselves, take up their responsibilities, strengthen cooperation among the
youth and youth structures as a platform, speak up and promote youth voices in the context of
Africa’s development” (African Youth Commission, 2017). It further outlined its objectives as:
to organize all young people in Africa and Diaspora for the promotion of African unity and
development through linkage of youth and youth structures and mobilization of resources
(human, technical, technology and finance) to support the work of African youth, youth
structures, Pan African Youth Union and Youth Division of the African Union Commission
in their quest to effective service delivery and advocacy activities on the African Youth
Charter, other AU legal instruments and youth projects at national, regional and continental
levels for the advancement of Africa (African Youth Commission, 2017, p. 4).
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As it did with the PYU, the AU took an “arm-chair” approach to the AYC although it
played an indirect role in its creation. Towards the AYC General Assembly in January 2017, the
African Union Youth Division released a statement that was regarded as an attempt to either
sabotage or distance the continental body from the youth program. The statement, released on 13
January 2017, merely a week before the youth General Assembly, read:
With regards to the upcoming AYC Annual General Assembly on the 22-25 January 2017
in Addis Ababa, we wish to categorically state that we have not been involved in the
coordination of this event as has been erroneously reported across various
media. Unfortunately, this avoidable situation is a misrepresentation that has caused
confusion, particularly among prospective participants, and simultaneously hampered the
event’s credibility. (African Union Youth Division, 2017)
While making such damaging remarks, the division still went on to state that it would
encourage “pro-active initiatives of African youth in forming organizations, networks or think
tanks as a response to the prevailing challenges that affect them; whether it is at the national,
regional or continental levels” (African Union Youth Division, 2017). Be that as it may, the AYC
General Assembly went ahead and elected its leadership. This then meant that there were now two
continental youth organizations: the PYU and the AYC. One of the arguments used by those at the
forefront of AYC is that unlike PYU that is host to the National Youth Councils, the AYC
membership is open to individual youth and civil society organizations that would not get an
opportunity to engage in the continental youth development agenda under the PYU framework.
The other argument used against the PYU is that it appears to be too political and aligned to ruling
parties in Africa of which some are responsible for the suppression of the youth and
underdevelopment. In other words, the PYU, through its national youth councils, stands complicit.
There have been responses from African youth, responses to gerontocracies,
authoritarianism, corruption and underdevelopment, outside the PYU and AYC structures. One of
the well-known initiatives taken by the youth of Africa to ensure political participation is what has
come to be known as the Arab Springs - the popular grassroots protests that took place in North
Africa and toppled several African dictators. Ruge (2012) explains what underpinned the Arab
Spring.
At the heart of the Arab Spring was a disgruntled youth class seeking democratic
representation and economic participation. Remember Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian
street vendor whose self-immolation launched the uprisings? He didn’t set himself ablaze
because he had a smart phone. His self-immolation was his last desperate attempt to bring
attention to his economic exclusion. His peers in the region sympathized and, almost
overnight, Tunisia and the political landscape of most of Northern Africa changed. It was
a signal that Africa’s ruling class was under siege. On one end, Mr. Bouazizi, aged 26,
represented Africa’s emerging youth class, an impatient demographic eager to upend the
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status quo (he was only five years younger than the median Tunisian). On the other,
deposed dictator Ben Ali, age 76, stood as a breed of elder statesmen – disconnected from
the needs of populations, and facing extinction.
As dictators in North Africa were being toppled, their contemporaries in the rest of the
continent worked hard to control the youth and avoid similar uprising. Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni is said to have deployed the military into the streets of Kampala to quell protests (Smith,
2011). Despite these attempts, the youth in the zones with long serving and authoritarian leaders
still managed to wage protests in one way or the other. Years later, in 2014, the long-serving despot
Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso was forced to flee the country. Pictures of youth jubilantly
jumping on top of seats in Burkina Faso Parliament went viral on social media (Berman, 2014). In
stable democracies, where corruption and underdevelopment were rampant, particularly in
Southern Africa, the youth formed radical social movements agitating for transformation, social
justice and equality. Consider the case of Namibia as explained by Namibian academic Phanuel
Kaapama (2016, p. 32):
Namibia reached her Fanonian moment… a new generation has entered the country’s
social and political scene and has forcefully asked penetrating new questions. So,
Namibia’s ‘Fanonian moment’ has come in the form of the [Affirmative Repositioning]
AR movement. Other issues that have come under the radar of AR’s fervent political eye
include the perceived/allege widespread nepotism and corruption among the political and
economic elite… The AR movement has ‘declared war’ on what it calls the “general
zombie tendency” and its politics of hand-clapping and singing for the satisfaction of
politicians, by working towards liberating the youth by converting them into active citizens
and upright activists.
In some parts of North Africa, the youth have taken serious risks such as attempting to
cross rivers and oceans into Europe in search of economic opportunities and political stability.
Consider the case that The Gambia reported, “for its size, Gambia is experiencing a
disproportionate number of people leaving the country. Its population is just under 2 million, yet
over the past two years, it has been ranked fourth and fifth in the International Organisation for
Migration’s league of the six main nationalities identified attempting to cross the Mediterranean
from Libya to Italy” (Hunt, 2015). In North, East and West Africa some youth resolved to join
armed military groups such as Boko Haram and others (Onuoha, 2014).
This account and survey of continental youth political participation and developmental
agenda was necessary to buttress the point that the scope of analysis should not only concern itself
with the center and the institutions within its reach but should also consider (a) the existence of a
periphery, (b) an understanding of why the periphery exists, and (c) the interaction, if any, between
the center and periphery. The fundamental question, therefore, remains - who is in? Who is
included in the center-led conversation and who do they represent? Indeed, who is out and what
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do they feel and what are they going to and willing to do about it? It is only when these questions
are answered that it can be determine how youth political participation can be improved.
Agenda 2063 - Who Is The “We”?
The Essence of Agenda 2063
Agenda 2063 is a program of the AU adopted by African Heads of State and Government
who assembled in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the 24th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the
Union in January 2015. In that session outcome, the African Heads of State and Governments
romanticized Agenda 2063 as
“[an] endogenous plan for transformation. It harnesses the continent’s comparative advantages
such as its people, history and cultures; its natural resources; its position and repositioning in the
world to effect equitable and people-centered social, economic and technological transformation
and the eradication of poverty. It seeks to fulfil our obligation to our children as an intergenerational compact, to develop Africa’s human capital; build social assets, infrastructure and
public goods; empower women and youth; promote lasting peace and security; build effective
developmental states and participatory and accountable institutions of governance; [articulate]
Africa’s vision and roadmap for sequencing our sectoral and normative, national, regional and
continental plans into a coherent whole; plus, be a call to action to all Africans and people of
African descent, to take personal responsibility for the destiny of the continent and as the primary
agents of change and transformation, and a commitment from citizens, leadership, governments
and institutions at national, regional and continental levels to act, coordinate, and cooperate for the
realization of this vision” (AU, 2015, p. 13).
And, as a policy framework that aims to provide a collective developmental path for
Africa’s development, Agenda 2063 is anchored on 7 pillars: (1) a prosperous Africa based on
inclusive growth and sustainable development; (2) an integrated continent, politically united and
based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance; (3) an Africa of
good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; (4) a peaceful
and secure Africa; (5) an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values
and ethics; (6) an Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African
people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and (7) an Africa as a strong,
united and influential global player and partner (AU, 2015).
Youth Content in Agenda 2063
While there might not be a specific aspiration that speaks to youth political participation,
it is important to note that aspiration 6 speaks of an Africa whose development is people driven
and relies on the potential of the African people, especially its youth. What Agenda 2063 does,
despite tokenism analysis, is to depart from a longstanding tradition of the OAU and AU of
peripherising youth development. In fact, the OAU Charter, in both Article II (purposes) and
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Article III (principles), makes no mention or inference to youth (Elias, 1965). The Constitutive
Act of the AU also does not change this state of affairs. Its Article 3 (on the Objectives of the AU)
and Article 4 (on the Principles of the AU) both fail to make mention of the youth (AU, 2000).
While some might argue that the youth do not necessarily warrant mentioning in these legislative
instruments, it must be noted that the AU Constitutive Act mentions in Article 4 the promotion of
gender equality (often a twin to youth empowerment/inclusion) as one of the principles of the AU.
Agenda 2063, therefore, departs from the AU tradition of placing youth at the periphery. The
policy framework admits that “no society can reach its full potential, unless it empowers … youth”
and sets an objective of having an engaged and empowered youth (AU, 2015). Furthermore, it
articulates and makes the following daring declarations on youth as part of Aspiration 6:
 The youth of Africa shall be socially, economically and politically empowered through the
full implementation of the African Youth Charter.
 All forms of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of
young people will be eliminated, and youth issues mainstreamed in all development
agendas.
 Youth unemployment will be eliminated, and Africa’s youth guaranteed full access to
education, training, skills and technology, health services, jobs and economic
opportunities, and recreational and cultural activities as well as financial means and all
necessary resources to allow them to realize their full potential.
 Young African men and women will be the path breakers of the African knowledge society
and will contribute significantly to innovation and entrepreneurship. The creativity, energy
and innovation of Africa’s youth shall be the driving force behind the continent’s political,
social, cultural and economic transformation.
It is evident that Agenda 2063 has some content on the youth. As stated before, the decision
to place youth in a central/mainstream AU document is a serious departure from the policy
positions and approach of both the OUA and AU. In 2013, the AU started consulting the youth
regarding Agenda 2063. The consultations will later bear fruit if the content of Agenda 2063 is
taken into consideration. In November 2013 in Hamamet, Tunisia, the AU held consultation with
the youth on Agenda 2063. It was at this gathering that the youth immaculately presented to the
AU their desire to actively participate in the politics and governance of the AU, and its member
states. The youth went further to indicate that the Africa they want is one wherein they are involved
in the drafting of policies and take an active part in the implementation and monitoring process.
At that conference, youth political participation was invoked. Resultantly, a working group called
the African Union Youth Working Group (AUYWG) was established to ensure that the resolution
of the youth that gathered there was included in the African developmental way forward in general
and in Agenda 2063 in particular. Four years later, in 2017, the AUYWG transformed itself into
an independent continental youth organization, the AYC, whose primary purpose would be to
monitor the AUC and the AU and ensure that youth concerns would not be placed at the periphery
(Dhlamini, 2017). This development alone indicates not only the input youth made into Agenda
2063 but their determination to create their own independent spaces and ensure political
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participation. The other aspects of youth consultation and input into Agenda 2063 took place at
the state level. The AU policy organ, at its July 2014 meeting in Equatorial Guinea, had tasked
member states to embark upon domestic consultations with various stakeholders (youth, academia,
women, civil society and women) and submit the outcomes to the AUC by 31 October 2014. South
Africa, for example, held such consultation with the youth on 11 July 2014 (DIRCO, 2015).
‘It Is In But Not In’
In November 2015, the biggest daily newspaper in Namibia, The Namibian, ran a story that
President Hage Geingob had temporarily moved out of the State House to his mansion on the
outskirts of the capital city, Windhoek, to allow for expensive renovations that were in line with
his taste. The Presidential Affairs Minister, Frans Kapofi, was at pains in explaining as to whether
the President had moved out of the State House. In response to journalists, who were asking for
confirmation as to whether the president has indeed moved out, Kapofi flip-flopped stating the
following, “He [president] is here but he is not here” (Immanuel & Mongudhi, 2015). Kapofi’s
explanation is a fitting importation to explain youth political participation in Agenda 2063 or,
though slightly amended, to ‘it is in, but not in’. While there is considerable content and mention
in Agenda 2063 of youth, it is not clear as to whether this constitutes political participation. The
language and grammar of Agenda 2063 speaks to what the AU will do for youth and not what it
can do together with youth. It sees youth as mere subjects to benefit from the generosity of their
elders who have now mentioned them in their documents. It makes use of terms such as “support
young people” and many ‘othering’ terms when discussing the youth. The main version, called the
popular version of Agenda 2063, states the following as the actionable programs that speak to
youth (AU, 2015):
… support young people as drivers of Africa’s renaissance, through investment in their
health, education and access to technology, opportunities and capital, and concerted
strategies to combat youth unemployment and underemployment. Ensure faster movement
on the harmonization of continental admissions, curricula, standards, programmes and
qualifications and raising the standards of higher education to enhance the mobility of
African youth and talent across the continent.
It is evident that what is an envisaged and actionable program of the Agenda 2063 does not
include political participation. The language and grammar of Agenda 2063 make itself available
to the interpretation that reform and youth inclusion are limited to health, education, technology,
economic opportunities and education. Youth political participation is not conspicuously part of
Agenda 2063. They are thus perceived as readily available beneficiaries of the political generosity
of their elders who have now included their issues in key policy documents such as Agenda 2030.
The youth are, therefore ‘In but not in’ in Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 is often paraded, and its
content so read, around the phrase of ‘The Africa We Want.’ Although it appears that youth are
indeed part of the we, or they might perceive themselves as part of the we, it appears, on closer
inspection, that the we is an exclusive imagery of the African Heads of State and Government. As

International Journal of African Development v.5 n.1 Spring 2018

113

will be further elaborated in the proceeding pages, youth political participation remains a
peripheral concern despite making an appearance in key policy documents of the AU.
African Political Elite Orientation towards Youth Political Participation
As has been explored and displayed earlier, youth matters have always been peripheral in
the imagination and discourse of African political leaders. If the youth matters are themselves
peripheral, one can only imagine how distant youth political participation would be in the minds
of African political leaders. To understand what and how African leaders perceive youth, one only
needs to study how the African governments conceptualize ministries dealing with youth affairs.
A short illustration is thus necessary.
Table 3
Country and youth participation
Country Name
Name of Ministry
Youth and Sport
Angola
Youth, Professional Education and Employment
Burkina Faso
Youth Affairs and Civic Education
Cameroon
Youth and Sports
DRC
Youth and Sports
Ethiopia
Youth and Sports
Gabon
Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs
Kenya
Gender and Youth, Sports and Recreation
Lesotho
Youth and Sports
Liberia
Youth and Citizenship Building
Mali
Youth, Sports and National Service
Namibia
Youth Development
Nigeria
Youth and ICT
Rwanda
Youth, Employment and Promotion of Civic Values
Senegal
Youth and Sports
Sudan
Youth and Sports
The Gambia
Basic Development, Crafts, Youth and Youth Employment
Togo
Youth, Sports, Women and Families
Tunisia
Youth and Children Affairs
Uganda
Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment
Zimbabwe
Table 3 represents a random selection of 20 African countries and indicates the following:
(a) most African leaders view the youth’s main objective and role as that of entertainment, chasing
footballs and dancing/singing during national events. It is for this reason that in most African
countries youth ministries are placed together with recreation, sports, national service or civic
education.; but (b) Zimbabwe sees youth in relation to economic empowerment and indigenization,
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Kenya links youth to planning, and Rwanda links youth to ICT which provides a new and fresh
perspective that departs from the orthodox linkage of youth to entertainment and sports. With the
exception of few cases, this illustrates that youth are perceived as peripheral issues. It is therefore
understandable that youth play a very small, if any, role in continental agenda setting.
As such, it can be argued that despite its predecessor the OAU that started off as a peoplecentered continental body that at one point assisted non-state actors fighting for national liberation,
the AU remains engaged in elite politics. It is therefore no surprise that, although Agenda 2063
speaks about fighting for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, the AU recently
resolved to admit Morocco to the African Union without a clear explanation and direction
(Kazeem, 2017). What is clear is that once an elite pact is concluded, the aspiration of young men
and women fighting with determination in Western Sahara does not matter (Akwei, 2017). The
youth, including those of Western Sahara, are to remain beneficiaries of the ‘generous’ elders who
have mentioned them in key documents such as Agenda 2063. When the African passport was
launched at the 27th Summit of the AU in Kigali, Rwanda, the first recipients where not youth to
symbolize a future-looking continent but the African elites, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and
Chadian President Idris Deby Itno, who already enjoy diplomatic privileges until death. Giving
these individuals African passports thus becomes irrelevant on close inspection (Adibe, 2016).
These are amongst the many reasons that support the argument that the AU prioritizes elite interest
dwarfing any elevation of matters such as youth political participation.
In a 2011 Afrobarometer’s working paper titled The Political Participation of Africa’s
Youth: Turnout, Partisanship and Protest, Danielle Resnick and Daniela Casale capture the
orientation of African youth as it relates to political participation:
Our findings suggest that Africa’s youth, particularly those residing in urban areas, operate
in broadly similar ways to their counterparts in other regions of the world. In comparison
with their older compatriots, the youth vote less and are more likely to demonstrate no
partisanship or an attachment to opposition parties rather than any affinity to incumbent
parties. Yet, the likelihood of their involvement in protests is not significantly different
from that of their older counterparts. Moreover, we find that the youth, unlike older voters,
tend to vote less the longer an incumbent party has been in office. In addition, poor
incumbent performance on job creation, compared with other socio-economic issues,
increases the likelihood of the youth to express either no partisanship or an affinity to the
opposition. In terms of protest activity, higher levels of education and economic
deprivation, as well as a lack of satisfaction with democracy, increase the likelihood that
the youth will protest while demonstrating a null impact on their older cohorts’ protest
activities. (Resnick & Casale, 2011, p. 2)
At the time Resnick and Casale (2011) published their paper, Africa had just experienced
the youth-led uprising in North Africa that toppled long-serving dictators and authoritarian leaders.
As stated in the introduction to this paper, a young Mohamed Bouazizi found himself in
circumstances that were confirmed by the studies of Resnick and Casale, which led him to setting
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himself alight and becoming a martyr of the youth-led revolution that spread fast and had as its
casualty some long-serving African authoritarian leaders. The marginalization of the youth and the
consequences thereto can be placed squarely at the doorstep of an unresponsive policy
environment and the ‘periphering’ of the youth from mainstream political participation. Indeed, it
is the failure of African states to engage the youth into activities that are aimed at influencing the
selection, constituting and general decisions of the government bureaucracy. As previously stated,
the marginalization of the youth from mainstream political participation and ‘periphering’ the
youth did not leave the youth idling. They found alternative forms of political participation at their
location - the periphery. To the surprise of many, as what happened with the Arab Spring and with
popular urbanized protests in southern Africa, the periphery found its way to the mainstream
forcing the political elite to either capitulate or engage those who were seen as ‘peripherised’
(Branch & Mampilly, 2015).
The AU in Agenda 2063 adopted a language and grammar that can be said to have
diagnosed the danger of ‘peripherising’ the youth. In what can be seen as either appeasement or
commitment to prevent the relapse of the popular protests, Agenda 2063 promised that “all forms
of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of young people will be
eliminated, and youth issues mainstreamed in all development agendas” (AUC, 2015). Although
the AU documents, such as Agenda 2063, appear to suggest that the AU and its member states are
somewhat committed to bring about real political participation, its rhetoric does not seem to be
supported by credible institutional arrangements. Consider the Youth Division of the AU that is
responsible for Africa’s youth agenda at the AUC. The division explains that it promotes youth
participation by “organizing forums and celebrating Africa Youth Day” (AU, 2017). It goes further
to admit that its mandate is to use the outcomes and recommendations to strengthen the youth.
This is a clear indication of two things: firstly, like is the case amongst AU member states, the AU
understands the youth in the context of entertainment and celebration days like Africa Youth Day;
secondly, it is an admission that the mandate of the division is not to influence decisions but to use
the outcomes and recommendation (already made) to strengthen the youth. In other words, youth
are to be beneficiaries and recipients of the “generosity” of the elders. Had the AUC, its youth
division and member states been interested in genuine political participation, it would have
endorsed campaigns such as Not Too Young to Run, supported and spearheaded by the UN
Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth, Ahmad Alhendawi. This campaign aims at doing away with
restrictive practices, particularly in most African countries, where state policy prevents young
people from running for public office (Srour, 2016)
Conclusion – What Is To Be Done?
Make the Circle Bigger
If there is any lesson to be learned from recent popular and far-reaching events spearheaded
by the youth from the Arab Spring in North Africa to violent extremists in West and East Africa
and popular urbanized protests in southern Africa, it is this: it is in the interest of the African elites
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to engage the African youth and ensure that they facilitate political participation in mainstream
national politics in a genuine, inclusive and constructive manner. The African youth have proven
that they do not need permission and are capable of organizing their own independent forms of
political participation that often lead to their desired outcomes - destructive as it may seem
particularly to those profiting in an exclusive status quo. It is in the interest of peaceful coexistence
for the African leaders to create an enabling environment for political participation of youth. The
current leaders must, indeed, make the circle bigger.
Linking Youth to Economic Freedom
The underlying objective of the African liberation struggle against colonialism was not
only to bring about self-determination but also to solve the then contractions of political power.
The understanding and imagination of the liberating leaders, such as the likes of Kwame Nkrumah,
were that political freedom will lead to economic freedom for the oppressed masses on the African
continent. In fact, one of Nkrumah’s famous phrases has been one that states that you first seek
the political kingdom and the rest shall be added unto you. The ‘rest’ that Nkrumah was referring
to is seen as the economic kingdom. It is now a common understanding that Nkrumah’s dream was
not fulfilled (Mashele & Qobo, 2014). This dismal failure has not left youth idling. The youth have
understood the liberating generation as having failed economically thus necessitating the current
need for economic freedom fighters to emerge and fight for economic freedom (Shivambu, 2014).
Although the youth understands that their mission is to continue the incomplete struggle to solve
the remaining contradictions of economic power, the struggle was started by the liberating
generation, and it has become impossible to pursue this struggle without confronting the very same
fighters and victors of political freedom because of their positionality (Seibeb, 2016). For as long
as the AU member states continue to define youth from the perspective of entertainment, sports
and agents of celebration during national festivals and events, conflicts between these states and
the youth will continue to occur. As such, examples of Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Kenya who locate
youth in the context of economic freedom – viewing youth as an agency of solving the remaining
contradictions of economic power – must be emulated.
Appropriate African Community Outlook to Youth State Policy
Because of the conduct of the politics of the state, the liberation generation has often taken
an opportunistic approach to the appropriation of African tradition and culture. The African
political elites often resort to African tradition and practices such as respect of elders to
opportunistically escape from accountability and evade serious questions related to their political
conduct. There are several African practices and value systems that remain important and can assist
in bringing about the youth’s political participation in the mainstream national discourse. One such
African value system is the African outlook or conceptualization of a community. Africans have
always understood the community as consisting of (a) the dead, (b) the living, and (c) those yet to
be born (Kamalu, 2000). The dead are regarded as part of the community although may not be
visible to everyone. They are in the ancestry watching over, supervising and protecting the living.
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For their part, the living plays a dual role: firstly, they live their lives and lead society in adherence
in regard and observation of the values and norms that were left by the departed who are in the
ancestry and part of the community watching over them; secondly, the living leads their lives and
society in such a way that they preserve a good community for those who have yet to arrive on
earth. The community must be preserved in such a way that when the living takes their position in
the ancestry, they will be watching over the new living (the present unborn) who will preside over
a community that they left in good shape. The African elites opportunistically leave out this
outlook that has ensured accountability and self-regulation in the African traditional society
(Sesanti, 2011). An individual with this outlook would be hesitant of stealing the collective
resources for personal use because he/she is cognizant of the ancestors who are watching his deeds,
even those committed behind closed doors. He/She would be bothered by the thought of one-day
sitting in the ancestry witnessing the living scavenging and suffering because he/she looted and
squandered collective resources. Said differently and in the context of political participation, the
African political elite should ensure political participation of the young, fearing an eye-sore when
they are in the ancestry because they have left the unexposed and inexperienced to take over state
power without the requisite experiences because they were not given an opportunity to learn and
practice when they were young.
Decoloniality – Reimagining Africa
Related to the above discussion is the question of decoloniality, one of the many failures
of the liberating generation. The common mistake that the African elite have made over the past
decades of political freedom is to think that it is only them who are concerned about the African
perspective and the fight against colonialism. They have concluded that the generation of youth
born after independence has been influenced by western values. The African elites always see the
demands by this generation of youth as sponsored from outside, and thus concluded that the
growing dissent is the artwork of the underground of a ‘third force.’ The youth of southern Africa,
through popular radical protests against inequality, poverty, underdevelopment and neoliberalism,
have taken the African elites by surprise once it occurred that the discontentment is homegrown
and, in some instances, has strong Pan Africa, Black Consciousness and African communalistic
values (Mabhena, 2016). The demands on the state through radical protest actions for decent and
dignified housing for all and the demands for free quality decolonized higher education are all
prevalent in southern African as a case in point. The state and African elites must seriously
consider taking the decolonial discourse serious, and this includes dealing with the questions of
coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being. All these questions raised
by the youth of Africa speak to the deficit of their political participation.
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